

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15

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R 311640Z JAN 74

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3820

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0497

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: REVISIONS TO SPC VERIFICATION PAPER

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A. USNATO 236

B. STATE 17635

1. IS HAS NOW CIRCULATED REVISIONS TO SPC'S VERIFICATION PAPER WHICH RESULT FROM SPC JANUARY 28 DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT (DETAILS REF A). TEXT OF REVISED PARAGRAPH FOLLOWS, TOGETHER WITH IDENTIFICATION OF ALL UNBRACKETED CHANGES.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

5. THE ALLIES RECOGNISE THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH
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NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE NECESSARY PROVISION OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. BEGIN BRACKET IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE PARTICIPATE OF ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATE ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS NEEDS TO BE SOLVED. END BRACKET. OR BEGIN

BRACKET A QUESTION RELATED TO THIS POINT IS THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM THE ALLIANCE WILL USE TO ARRIVE AT VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS. THIS WILL REQUIRE A SEPARATE STUDY AT A TIME WHEN THE NATURE OF THE OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM HAS BECOME CLEARER. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THE ALLIES WILL BE INTERESTED IN SHARING INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR REACHING INDEPENDENT AND COLLECTIVE JUDGEMENTS REGARDING WARSAW PACT COMPLIANCE WITH ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. END BRACKET

VERIFICATION OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS

16. AN ALLIED PROPOSAL TO INSPECT OBSERVANCE OF PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FURTHER DIMINISH THEIR NEGOTIABILITY. PROPOSAL OF SUCH A MEASURE COULD IMPEDE OVERALL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND PREJUDICE PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT OR OTHER MORE ESSENTIAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. HOWEVER, NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS SHOULD BE ASSURED IN ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: BRACKETS DROPPED SINCE LANGUAGE CONFORMS TO PARA 33A OF C-M(73)83. END COMMENT)

VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

18. THIS OBJECTIVE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIES AS VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT COULD INVOLVE THE ASSIGNMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWALS. THE RIGHT OF INSPECTION WOULD BE CONTINUOUS FOR AS LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT WAS IN FORCE. (COMMENT: UK COMPROMISE FORMULATION WHICH ADHERES TO INTENT OF PARA 7, REF B. END COMMENT.) IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY FOR INSPECTORATES TO BE IN THE AREA AT ALL TIMES. THE INSPECTORATES WOULD, IN ADDITION TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, HAVE ALL OF POLITICAL ADVANTAGES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE ACCURACY IN THE VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN PERSONNEL, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE IN BROAD TERMS.

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SECTION IV, TITLE OF "A" TO READ:

USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AND/OR FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS (COMMENT: UK INTRODUCED "AND". END COMMENT).

22. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER FLEXIBILITY, EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY; THEY ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO CIRCUMVENT AND REQUIRE FEWER MEN TO STAFF. IN PRINCIPLE, THEY CAN PERFORM ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS OF FIXED POSTS, WHILE THE REVERSE IS NOT TRUE. THEY ALSO HAVE GREATER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING POTENTIAL THAN FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS. IN THE MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS, THE CHIEF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF

MOBILE TEAMS OVER STATIONED OBSERVERS IS THAT ONLY THE FORMER COULD DETERMINE PRECISELY WHICH KINDS AND SIZES OF UNITS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND WHAT THE ORDER OF BATTLE HAD BEEN AT PARTICULAR MILITARY POSTS, USEFUL INFORMATION FOR POST-REDUCTION ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF MONITORING. BOTH SYSTEMS ARE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND WOULD INVOLVE NATO IN NO UN-ACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY WHETHER IMPLEMENTED ON THEIR OWN OR AS A COMBINATION. BEGIN BRACKET HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN THE REDUCTION PHASE, STATIC POSTS COULD PERFORM A MOST USEFUL FUNCTION AT MAJOR EXIT POINTS. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THEREFORE, THE IDEAL SYSTEM WOULD BE A MOBILE ONE SUPPORTED BY SOME STATIC POSTS. END BRACKET

23. FOR WITHDRAWAL MONITORING, NEITHER SYSTEM HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO NATO OVER THE OTHER, AND NEITHER HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DRAWBACKS. (COMMENT: PHRASE "TO NATO" INTRODUCED BY UK. END COMMENT)
HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES TO FIXED POSTS FOR THE LONG-TERM MONITORING OF POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (SEE PARAGRAPH 28). THEREFORE, DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT AGREEMENT TO FIXED POSTS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO AVOID FIXED POSTS (SHOULD THIS BE DESIRED) FOR THE MONITORING OF POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS.

25. CONCLUSION: BEGIN BRACKET BECAUSE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF MOBILE TEAMS AND FOR REASONS OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS, THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE 21(A) EXCLUSIVELY. ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS
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PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE, SHOULD THE ALLIES ADVANCE 21(B) TO THE OTHER SIDE. END BRACKET

OR

BEGIN BRACKET THE ALLIES SHOULD INITIALLY ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE FOR A COMBINATION OF BOTH SYSTEMS. IF THIS APPROACH PROVES ABORTIVE, THEN A SYSTEM BASED ON MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED, SINCE INTER ALIA THIS IS THE SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD PROVE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR VERIFICATION OF THE POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (SEE PARAGRAPH 30 BELOW). ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE SHOULD THE ALLIES ACCEPT THE SYSTEM DESCRIBED AT 21(B) ABOVE. END BRACKET

26 STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND /OR CHOKE POINT POSTS(2)
COULD BE USED BEGIN BRACKET IN PLACE OF OR END BRACKET AS A SUPPLEMENT TO MOBILE TEAMS. AS THEIR NAMES IMPLY, THEY WOULD BE LOCATED PRIMARILY AT KEY CROSSING POINTS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND AT MAJOR TRANSPORTATION HUBS WITHIN THE AREA. HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE FOR THE MILITARY REASONS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 22 TO STATIC POSTS WHICH, ON THEIR OWN, WOULD BE A VERY POOR AND EXPENSIVE WAY OF TRYING TO VERIFY POST-REDUCTIONS FORCE LEVELS. (COMMENT: UK WISHES TO DELETE BRACKETED

PHRASE IN FIRST SENTENCE; LAST SENTENCE INCLUDES ADD-ON. END
COMMENT

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30. CONCLUSION: BEGIN BRACKETS THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE VERY EFFORT TO
NEGOTIATE THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS, AS OUTLINED IN B
ABOVE, AND SHOULD NEGOTIATE ADEQUATE ACCESS BY THESE TEAMS TO
KEY TRANSPORTATION ROUTES INTO AND WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.
SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY POOR
SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS, THEY SHOULD BE PROPOSED TO THE
OTHER SIDE ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE TO BE NON-NEGOTIABLE.
END BRACKET

OR

BEGIN BRACKETS THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF
MOBILE TEAMS SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC TEAMS AT CHOLKE POINTS.
SHOULD THIS APPROACH FAIL, MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED,
SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY
POOR SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS. HOWEVER, FROM THE MILITARY
VIEW ALONE A SYSTEM INVOLVING A REDUCED NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS
WITH SOME STATIC POSTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A LARGER NUMBER
OF EITHER MOBILE OR STATIC POSTS ON THEIR OWN. END BRACKET
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OR

BEGIN BRACKET THE ALLIES COULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF
MOBILE TEAMS, STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS AND/OR STATIC
PERIMETER POSTS. END BRACKET

C. "OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL", I.E. THAT MANNED AIRBORNE
RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS BE USED TO MONITOR AGREED WITH-
DRAWALS AND/OR POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

31. THE SYSTEMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF SENSORS,
MOSTLY PHOTOGRAPHIC. INSPECTORS WOULD FLY ABOARD AIRCRAFT
BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE(NORMALLY TO BE INSPECTED COUNTRY),
BEGIN FOOT NOTE

(2) THESE FIXED POSTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER OF
5TH OCTOBER, PAGES 45-50.

END FOOTNOTE
UTILISE SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE(1), AND BE ACCOMPANIED
BY LIAISON OFFICERS FOR THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. THE FLIGHTS WOULD
ORIGINATE IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY, ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS
WOULD BE GIVEN, AND THEY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON PRESCRIBED
ROUTES AND ALTITUDES. NATO SHOULD AIM FOR MAXIMUM FLIGHT
FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH MUTUAL POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, FLIGHT
SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

33. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES: THE APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE
WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL
NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS FORM OF SURVEILLANCE, AS THE LEVEL OF
TECHNOLOGY IS WITHIN THEIR MEANS. THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD TEND
TO FOSTER PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONFIDENCE IN THE OBSERVANCE
OF THE AGREEMENT. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: THE GROUND PERSONNEL
AND INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
MIGHT BE EXPENSIVE. ALSO, EACH SIDE MIGHT INTERPRET THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF AIR SAFETY RESTRICTIONS BY THE OTHER AS AN ATTEMPT

TO CONCEAL SOMETHING, AND FRICTION COULD RESULT. (COMMENT:
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SENTENCE IS UK INPUT. END COMMENT)
PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT
OBJECT TO WARSAW PACT AERIAL INSPECTION OF THEIR TERRITORY ON THE
GROUNDS THAT IT WAS TOO ENCOMASSING AND INTRUSIVE. WHILE GROUND
INSPECTORS COULD BE LIMITED LARGELY TO VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH
MBFR AGREEMENTS, AERIAL INSPECTORS COULD, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE,
GLEAN INTELLIGENCE ON A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OVER VERY LARGE
AREAS. APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE OVER ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD
BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF LIMITED AS DESCRIBED IN THE FIRST PARA-
GRAPH OF THIS SECTION.

BEGIN FOOTNOTE:

(1) ONE DELEGATION OBSERVED THAT THE MODALITIES OF AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE, E.G. THE QUESTION OF USING SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE, WILL REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. (COMMENT: THIS IS NEW UK FOOTNOTE. END COMMENT) END FOOTNOTE

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

38. THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM TO COVER WITHDRAWALS, POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVEL, BEGIN BRACKET, AND, TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES END BRACKET. BEGIN BRACKET IT SHOULD BE A REASONABLY DENSE SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, SUPPORTED IF APPROPRIATE BY SOME MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. BECAUSE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF MOBILE TEAMS OVER FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS AND FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE FIXED POSTS TO THE OTHER SIDE ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE. END BRACKET OR BEGIN BRACKET IT COULD BE A SYSTEM COMPRISING MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS STATIC POSTS AND SOME MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. IT SHOULD BE AN OPTIMAL SYSTEM, THE EXACT DETAILS OF WHICH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE NATURE OF THE AGREED REDUCTIONS AND COLLATERAL MEASURES. DEFINITIVE EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF VERIFICATION HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE AS CERTAIN POLITICAL PROBLEMS STILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. END BRACKET. (COMMENT: LAST SENTENCE IS UK ADD-ON. END COMMENT) SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
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SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS BEGIN BRACKET AND COLLATERAL MEASURES END BRACKET.
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